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This paper investigates bond issuance of non-financial corporations in advanced economies during the 
period 1999-2003, attempting to understand motives for issuing in foreign currency, and determinants 
for the choice of currency. We consider the following influences on the currency choice when issuing 
foreign currency denominated debt: the microeconomic characteristics of the firm, the 
macroeconomic institutional environment and the financial particularities of the bond issue. We find 
that in addition to cost minimisation, hedging motives and the desire to establish an investor base 
influences the choice of currency. At the same time, market conventions and regulation also affect the 
choice. 
Keywords: Bond issuance, Foreign currency denominated debt, Panel logit, nested logit, conditional 
logit 
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Non-Technical Summary 
Since its introduction the euro gained significant ground as a currency for international debt issuance 
and is now one of the three most preferred currencies internationally. Excluding all issuers that were 
euro area residents, net issuance of bonds in euro in 2006 amounted to 287bn USD, or 21.7% of total 
international bond issuance. In December 2006 the euro share in the stock of international debt 
securities reached between 27.8% and 47%, depending on the measure used. Over the last year, 
issuance of euro-denominated bonds from the emerging markets in Africa increased substantially. 
However, among the top twenty issuers in euro denominated bonds there are only two non-financial 
corporations. Hence, this paper asks: What drives non-financial firms to issue bonds in foreign 
currency? Which companies display a “home bias” in bond issuance? And what determines a firm’s 
appetite for issuing bonds in euro?  
We find that a main driver for issuing bonds in foreign currency is the attempt to hedge exposure to 
foreign exchange volatility. But the firm’s choice appears to be constrained by regulatory differences 
and market idiosyncrasies. In particular, information asymmetries concerning the regulatory 
framework abroad make is costly to issue in another currency, which reduces the number of small 
bond issues in foreign currency. Market idiosyncrasies in the different currency areas affect the choice 
of currency of corporate bond issuers. Specifically, the length of sovereign benchmark yield curves 
differs widely across currency areas, which impacts the choice of currency. Corporate bonds with 
long maturity tend to be issued in British pounds, as the underlying sovereign curve has the longest 
duration compared to the curves in the US, Japan and the euro area.  
We set up a new database that combines 8,022 bond issues covering the period 1999 to 2003, i.e. the 
first five years after the introduction of the euro. In total, 2,471 firms issued 12,210 bonds worldwide 
during that period, according to our database. After combining the bond data with balance sheet 
information, the sample comprises 9,233 bonds. After incorporating subsidiary information for the 
firms, we end up with 8,022 issues in the four main currencies dollar, euro, yen and pound, which we 
use to investigate reasons for firms in the UK, the US, Japan and the euro area to issue bonds in a 
foreign currency. The four currency areas represent the most sophisticated bond markets and account 
for 91% of total bond issuance. 
Our sample shows a strong home bias of issuers – 86% of bonds are issued in the firm’s home 
currency with notable variation across countries: while UK firms issue only 41% of their bonds in 
their home currency, this is true for 56% of bonds from euro area corporations, 93% of bonds by 
Japanese and even 96% of US companies. A regional bias towards US firms also noteworthy; they 
account for more than 50% of all bond issues (4,675 out of 8,022), while euro area (1,331 or 16.6%), 
Japanese (1,554 or 19.4%) and UK firms (462 or 5.8%) are much less active bond issuers. The bias 
towards the US currency is even more pronounced, as 5,127 issues are denominated in US dollar, 
while 1,616 bonds were denominated in yen, 983 in euro and 296 in pounds.  
We find that firms issue foreign currency bonds mainly to hedge exposure to foreign currency risk. 
This is true both for the whole sample and for the subset of US firms. Whether measured by the 6
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proportion of foreign subsidiaries or by M&A activity abroad, foreign exposure increases the 
likelihood of issuing in foreign currency. This confirms the hypothesis of previous studies that more 
geographically diversified firms are more likely to use foreign currencies to issue bonds for hedging 
purposes.  
Strategic considerations also play a role in the decision to issue in foreign currency. Specifically, large 
companies are more active in international bond issuance. This is likely to be due to three reasons. 
First, large companies may want to diversify their investor base across currency regions. Second, 
large firms may also face constraints in raising funds in their domestic markets. Third, large firms 
may be better known abroad, easing access and lowering borrowing costs in foreign bond markets. 
For US firms, we also find that firm leverage raises the likelihood to issue in foreign currency, 
supporting the idea that US credit constrained firms may find it easier to borrow abroad.  
Regulatory differences appear to constrain bond issuance in foreign currency, since issuing abroad 
involves substantial fixed transaction costs. Hence, only larger issues in foreign currency are 
economical and firms prefer to issue small bonds in domestic currency. Fixed transaction costs are 
likely a result of regulatory differences, including legal advice concerning disclosure and taxation 
issues, and of road showing costs to overcome information asymmetries. All of these create a “home 
bias” in bond issuance for issues in smaller size. The largest bond issues tend to take place in euro but 
also pound and yen are preferred to the dollar for large issues.  
Finally, market idiosyncrasies in the swap and the sovereign bond markets constrain the choice of 
currency in bond issuance. Longer bond duration reduces the likelihood of issuing in foreign 
currency. Long duration may make it expensive to swap foreign proceeds into domestic currency, as 
counterparty risk rises along the duration spectrum. More importantly, the break down into currency 
effects shows that duration is closely associated with the average duration of the underlying 
government bond markets. Market idiosyncrasies appear to play an important role when deciding the 
currency of issuance.  
The paper shows that even for the corporate bond market in the US, the UK and the euro area, 
regulatory differences appear to curtail bond issuance. Harmonizing regulatory systems would 
facilitate cross-currency bond issuance for smaller issues – and that means smaller companies – which 
is likely to result in more efficient allocation of funds.  
The findings also emphasize the role of the government bond market. Even in the highly developed 
countries that this paper considers, corporate bond issuance is affected by the extension of the 
underlying sovereign bond yield curve. The extension of the sovereign yield curve remains an 
important benchmark for corporate issuance in a given currency. Governments that want to deepen 
particular segments of the corporate yield curve can support this by building a liquid benchmark in 
that part of the duration spectrum.  
Appetite for issuance in euro is driven by foreign firms’ attempt to reduce exposure to currency 
volatility, the ability to tap into a market that can absorb large issues, while it may be hampered by 
costs of regulation and the relatively short duration of the sovereign yield curve. 7
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1.  Introduction 
At the time of the introduction of the euro in 1999 the US dollar dominated international financial 
transactions. Forecasts about the role of the euro in international bond markets ranged from an 
extremely limited role of the euro to a significant sell-off of dollar assets in favour of euro assets. 
While Frankel (1995) suggests that “there is little likelihood that some other currency will supplant 
the dollar as the world's premier reserve currency by the year 2020”, Portes and Rey (1998) argue that 
“[g]iven the euro’s fundamentals (…) the dollar will have to share the number-one position”. 
In fact, the euro has gained significant ground as one of the three preferred currencies in international 
capital markets since its introduction. In the last seven years there has been a continuous increase in 
the share of debt finance raised in euro. The European Central Bank (2003) reports a steady increase 
in the share of the euro in the stock of international debt securities from 20 percent in Q3 1998 to 
above 30 percent in Q1 2003. While the US dollar is still the most widely used settlement currency in 
foreign exchange markets and trade invoicing, the data indicate a prominent advance of the euro in 
international bond markets. Indeed, BIS (2004) data suggest that since early 2002 euro denominated 
issuance of bonds and notes has exceeded issuance in US dollars.  
Detken and Hartmann (2000) were the first to focus on factors that affect the optimal asset portfolio 
allocation among different currencies after the emergence of the euro. The paper considers factors 
related to market size, liquidity and transaction costs on one hand and factors related to risk 
diversification on the other. It finds that market size and liquidity effects that lower transaction costs 
take time to materialize. In addition, the data suggest no marked long-term changes in the structure of 
international investments with respect to portfolio risk considerations that would lead to a portfolio 
rebalancing towards the euro.  
Geis, Mehl and Wredenborg (2004) create a new database to analyse in some detail the issuers and 
holders of euro-denominated international bonds. They find that outside the euro area, the market is 
dominated by private sector issuance, particularly from Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, the 
international use of the euro has a strong regional focus, with the City of London playing an important 
role on both the supply and the demand sides, and as an intermediary. The euro area itself is shown to 
be an important driver of the international role of the euro, as euro area investors are significant 
purchasers of euro-denominated bonds issued by non-euro area residents.  
This paper attempts to further the understanding of this development by looking at the factors that 
drive the choice of currency in bond issuance by non-financial corporations. Studying the 
determinants of the currency-denomination decision of bond issues at the level of the firm we try to 
explain why the euro has become increasingly popular as a currency of issuance. We investigate 
various factors that influence the choice of currency when issuing Foreign Currency Denominated 8
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Debt (FCDD): the microeconomic characteristics of the firm, the macroeconomic institutional 
environment and the financial particularities of the bond issuance.  
The paper contributes to the literature by extending the dimensions of the currency decision problem. 
Earlier research has looked at debt issuance in home or foreign currency, while we consider a choice 
between many currencies. Keloharju and Niskanen (1997) use a panel of Finnish companies to 
examine the firms’ currency decision when issuing long-term debt. Nandy et al. (2002) extend the 
country coverage, using a panel of both Canadian and UK firms. Another body of literature (see 
Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli (2003) for a survey) focuses on the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations on debt composition and firm balance sheets. Mohapatra (2004) investigates the influence 
of the exchange rate regime on the choice of issuing debt in home or foreign currency. Finally, a 
paper by Esho et al. (2001) looks at the related market of syndicated loans, concentrating on the 
choice of home against foreign currency by East Asian firms.  
A second contribution to the literature consists in substantially extending the data coverage of 
previous studies, which have focussed on few countries and have used survey data. Kedia and 
Mozumdar (2003) are the first who extend the binary currency choice to a multivariate problem. 
However, their paper looks at FCDD by US companies only, giving it a strong regional focus. By 
contrast, we create a new dataset, which is representative of bond issuance in advanced economies as 
defined by the IMF.
5 International bond issues from Thompson Financial are matched with firm-level 
balance sheet data, drawn from Van Dijk’s Osiris database and linked with macro data from various 
sources, as explained in the appendix. 
We find that the choice of currency depends on both cost minimization and strategic considerations. 
Hedging motives affect costs, while strategic supply and demand effects concern mainly the limited 
capacity of the domestic bond market. Finally, we find that the choice of currency reflects the need to 
follow established market conventions as well as the costs of overcoming regulation.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical explanations suggested 
in the literature why companies may decide to issue FCDD. Section 3 discusses the econometric 
technique used, while section 4 explores the dataset. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and a 
final section concludes.  
2.  Theoretical Background 
 
Consider a firm that attempts to minimise borrowing costs when issuing debt. The firm’s CFO 
chooses the currency of issuance, taking as given the macroeconomic environment, the 
microeconomic characteristics of the firm itself and the financial set-up of the bond issue. The 
                                                           
5 For a definition, see IMF “World Economic Outlook” (2004, Statistical Appendix, Table B).  9
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different costs that the firm may incur are captured by International Accounting Standard IAS 23, 
according to which borrowing costs consist of three parts, which are discussed below: interest costs 
(section 2.1), foreign exchange differences (section 2.2) and debt issue transaction costs (section 2.3). 
In addition, the firm may take strategic considerations into account (section 2.4). 
2.1   Interest rate costs 
 
Interest rates differentials between two currencies affect the choice of currency when raising debt, as 
borrowers will issue in the currency with the lowest interest cost. In perfect markets, arbitrage would 
remove any difference between the expected interest rate costs in different currencies. However, price 
differences have been observed empirically for protracted periods of time. Recent evidence comes 
from the related literature on syndicated bank loans. Carey and Nini (2004) report that interest rate 
spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers are smaller in Europe than in the US.  
 
The empirical divergence in borrowing costs is explained by a strong home bias of lending firms. 
Other explanations for continued differences in interest rates include political risk (Aliber 1973, 
Doodley and Isard 1980), differences in tax rates (Levi, 1977; Shapiro, 1984) and different creditor 
rights (LaPorta et al, 1998). Market participants suggest that interest rate differentials between euro 
and US dollar denominated bonds may also be due to investors’ desire to diversify their portfolios.  
 
We estimated our models adding the interest rate differential among the explanatory variables.
6 
However, its sign was unstable across regressions and its coefficients turned out to be insignificant 
across all specifications. Finally, including the interest rate differential did not alter any of the other 
results. This mirrors recent evidence on increased market integration and low price differences. 
Accordingly, we decided not to include the interest rate differential in the regressions, as our results 
are not consistent with a failure of the uncovered interest parity conditions.  
 
In addition, established market conventions in a currency area may determine the specifics of a bond 
that can be placed in a currency area. We look at duration as such a feature. Since corporate bonds 
tend to be priced off the government yield curve the duration of corporate bonds in a currency area is 
likely to follow the expansion of the government curve. Especially bonds of longer duration depend 
on a liquid benchmark. Hence, the duration of corporate bonds will tend to mirror the duration of the 
government curve. At the microeconomic level, this implies that a firm is more likely to issue a bond 
with long duration in a currency area where the government bond curve displays a long duration. 
                                                           
6 See the definition of interest rate differential in table 9, in the appendix. 10
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2.2   Foreign exchange costs 
 
Previous studies have found that firms issue FCDD to hedge their foreign currency risk exposure 
(Keloharju and Niskanen, 1997; Esho et al., 2001; Nandy, 2002; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003). This 
incentive is particularly strong if the firm has exchange rate sensitive assets or revenues. Financial 
risk managers try to cover currency risk exposure at different time horizons, differentiating between 
translation risk and transaction risk. Transaction risk refers to (short-term) exchange rate risk from 
operational revenues – currency cash flow, purchases, or sales in another currency –, while translation 
risk arises from the (long-term) translation of overseas assets and liabilities into domestic currency.  
Operational revenues arise within a time frame of up to one year. As a result, transaction risk may be 
hedged using currency options or forward contracts, as the currency derivatives market up to one year 
is rather liquid. Over three-quarters of the total amount outstanding is in this segment (Bank for 
International Settlements 2004). In fact, this is the usual method of neutralising short-term currency 
risk. 
By contrast, the translation of overseas assets involves long-term exposure, often exceeding five 
years. This market segment is considerably less liquid with only nine percent of the total amount 
outstanding in currency options and forward contracts. This market segment is small because of the 
need to secure the currency swap by collateral, which makes the transaction costly for long-run debt. 
As a result, the proceeds from bonds in foreign currency with long duration are difficult to swap back 
into domestic currency. Because it is less simple for a firm to hedge long-term liabilities in the 
currency derivative market, companies use "natural" hedges, i.e. they borrow in the currencies of the 
countries where their assets are located. Recently, Huffmann and Makar (2004) have found empirical 
support for this behavioural pattern of using forward contracts for the short period, while issuing 
FCDD for long-term hedging.  
Exchange rate movements influence the exchange rate risk incurred when holding unhedged foreign 
assets. Previous work has in particular investigated the influence of the exchange rate regime on 
FCDD, finding a positive impact of exchange rate flexibility on FCDD. Esho et al. (2001) suggest 
that a floating exchange rate should lead to higher FCDD issuance. However, the effect is ambiguous 
as firms may take into consideration exchange rate volatility as a measure of the risk premium, which 
would reduce their inclination to issue bonds in foreign currency. At the sectoral level, Mohapatra 
(2004) finds that firms with primarily domestic currency earnings issue FCDD in fixed exchange rate 
regimes, while tradable good producers are the dominant foreign borrowers in flexible exchange rate 
regimes.  11
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2.3   Transaction costs 
 
Transaction costs of bond issuance may differ across currencies. Higher transaction costs may result 
from tax treatment, regulatory barriers, or disclosure requirements. In addition, capital controls or 
information asymmetries may isolate local markets, reducing efficiency due to lower competition in 
trading and clearance systems, among traders and investment bankers, and lower listing and 
monitoring standards.  
Recently, increased competition between investment banks has decreased underwriting fees and 
favoured the growth of bond issues. The consolidation of the European markets in particular has 
greatly reduced the advantage of local knowledge for national banks and has attracted global 
underwriters. Most importantly, the regulatory requirements on currency matching for institutional 
investors’ portfolios are easier to fulfil in the larger currency area, reducing the segmentation of the 
euro bond market (Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) and Melnik and Nissim, (2004)). The entry of global 
investment banks in the euro bond market may have been a further stimulus to the supply of corporate 
debt in Europe. Since tax and regulatory issues are difficult to capture numerically at the macro level, 
we consider such cross-country differences by incorporating country dummies into our regressions.  
In addition, fixed issuance costs may make it prohibitively expensive to place a small bond in foreign 
currency. In particular, legal fees resulting from different tax treatments, regulations and disclosure 
requirements and one off costs for road showing an issue abroad may raise the fixed cost of a bond 
issue in foreign currency. Hence, bonds in foreign currency are likely to be larger than comparable 
bonds in the firm’s domestic currency. 
2.4.  Strategic supply and demand effects 
 
In addition to minimising immediate borrowing costs, strategic considerations with regard to the 
company’s overall goal to ensure sustainable low borrowing costs may affect the decision in which 
currency to borrow.  
On the demand side, a large amount of potential investors in a given currency area may raise the 
issuer’s interest to issue in that currency in order to establish an investor base in that market. In other 
words, building a reputation, or visibility, as a borrower may be a strategic incentive to borrow in a 
particular currency.
  FCDD may also work as a signalling device, demonstrating that the firm is 
willing to commit to higher standards of corporate governance and disclosure, which may make the 
firm more attractive also to domestic investors, thereby also reducing its domestic borrowing costs. 
On the supply side, firms may have financing needs that exceed the capacity of the local market. This 
may make it necessary to diversify into bonds denominated in other currencies so as to tap a wider 
investor base. In the same vein, the firms’ creditworthiness may be an incentive for firms to issue 12
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abroad. However, the sign of this effect is unclear. Keloharju and Niskanen (1997) suggest that FCDD 
is positively correlated with variables that proxy creditworthiness, such as firm size and credit rating. 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) suggest that more subsidiaries in a region may also contribute to 
building reputation as a borrower in a market. Esho et al. (2001) find a positive correlation between 
FCDD and leverage using data from emerging markets. The interpretation of this result depends on 
how we understand leverage. As documented in a large body of literature, investors see a more 
leveraged firm as less creditworthy.
7 Hence, Esho’s finding suggests that less creditworthy firms are 
more likely to be looking for funds abroad.
8  
3.  Methodology 
 
We present a static cost-minimization model, which is tractable and lends itself to empirical 
estimation. A firm decides to issue a bond in a given currency if doing so will minimise borrowing 
costs. There are J different currencies. Firms are indexed by subscript i. Under alternative j, the i
th 
firm faces a technology Tij describing the feasible operations it can undertake. Tij depends on the 
attributes of the firm and the currency. Minimising borrowing costs subject to Tij yields the restricted 
cost function Cij* which depends on characteristics of the firm’s technology, the firm’s market 
environment and the attributes of the currency choice. In other words the j
th currency will be picked 
by the i
th firm if 
 
Cij* = min{Cik*; k = 1, …K}. 
 
While we do not observe the minimization process, we have information on the choice of currency. A 
statistical model using a discrete dependent variable can be used to estimate the probability of any 
currency being chosen over any other currency.
9 Assume that the restricted cost function of firm i can 
be written as: 
 
Cij = c +  Xij +  Zi +  ij, 
 
where Cij = lnCij*, c is a constant term, Xij = [lnXij1*, … lnXijm*] is a vector of the m observable 
characteristics for the j
th currency and the characteristics of the i
th firm, which vary across currencies. 
Zi = [lnZi*] is a vector of firm i’s characteristics, such as firm size, leverage, etc., which are constant 
across currencies. Finally,   and   are vectors of unknown coefficients to be estimated, and  ij is a 
random term denoting the unobservable advantages to the i
th firm from issuing in the j
th currency 
                                                           
7 For an overview, see Hubbard (1998). 
8 The referee pointed out to us that leverage might also be interpreted as the firm’s cost effectiveness in bond 
issuance. While we were unable to substantiate such an interpretation with either market participants or in the 
literature, this would mean that the positive correlation between leverage and bond issuance abroad signals that 
the firm exploits its positive domestic reputation by issuing abroad.  
9 On discrete choice models see McFadden (1984).  13
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which is assumed to be independently distributed across i and j. We assume that the error term 
follows a Weibull distribution. Given J different options, the probability that currency j will be chosen 
satisfies: 
 
P(j|x) = P [Cij(Ti, Xij) < Cik(Ti, Xik) for j   k]. 
 
McFadden (1980) shows that under these conditions the probability that firm i chooses currency j is 
given by: 





Note that in this conditional logit model the Cs are the coefficients of the currency characteristics. The 
firm’s characteristics Zi cancel out, since they do not vary across currency alternatives. However, the 
model can be modified to allow for firm specific effects by creating dummy variables for the currency 
choices and interacting each of them with the firms’ individual characteristics Zi. 
 
A particular feature of the conditional logit model is that it requires the relative probabilities for any 
two alternatives (i.e. the odds ratio Pj/Pk) to depend only on the attributes of those two alternatives 
(the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property). This implies that adding another 
alternative or changing the characteristics of a third alternative should not affect the relative odds of 
picking alternative j over alternative k.  
 
Specifically, it is assumed that adding the domestic currency to the choice set would not alter the 
relative odds of any other two currencies being chosen. Even though firms have become increasingly 
multinational in recent decades, the major operations of most companies are conducted in the country 
of domicile. We model the currency decision as a two-step procedure, as shown in the decision tree in 
Figure 1. In the first step the firm decides whether to issue debt in domestic or in foreign currency. 
Once it has decided to issue in foreign currency, it chooses among a menu of foreign currencies. 
While estimating the model, we include a dummy for the domestic currency for each firm. Testing the 
significance of this domestic dummy will show whether firms prefer their domestic currency. In a 
separate regression we consider the choice between domestic and (any) foreign currency in a logit 
model to understand the first step of the currency choice. 14
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This particular structure of the decision process suggests another approach of modelling the choice, 
which permits considering the domestic currency as a particular case with a different weight than the 
rest of the currencies. Therefore, we group the currency alternatives into two subsets – domestic and 
foreign (the domestic subgroup contains only one currency) – and relax the IIA assumption between 
the subgroups while keeping it within the subgroups. The complete decision tree may be modelled as 
a nested logit model (cf. Train 2003, Ch. 4 for a survey). The nested logit model requires IIA to hold 
across subsets (twigs) in the branch, but not across branches. In addition, it allows for explicit 
estimation of the firm-specific characteristics’ influence on the choice of currency. The firm-specific 
cost levels associated with the decisions of issuing in domestic and foreign currency are:  
 









where Zi are firm characteristics, ei is the error term and FC and DC stand for foreign and domestic 
currency, respectively. The null alternative here is not to issue a bond. The probability of issuing in a 
foreign currency is then: 
 
(3)  P(firm i chooses a foreign currency) = exp( 
FCZi)/[1 + exp( 
FCZi) + exp( 
DCZi)],  
 
which is the standard multinomial logit equation, i.e. the nested logit combines a conditional logit 
model for the choice between twigs with a multinomial logit model for the choice between branches. 
Debt Issuance
Domestic Currency  Foreign Currency 
Currency 1  Currency 2  Currency J  …15
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The assumption is that the choice between the twigs satisfies the IIA property and comes after the 
choice between branches. In our context, this means that the choice between the domestic and any 
foreign currency is independent from the choice between foreign currencies. This gives the domestic 
currency a special significance in the choice-set, as suggested by the theory. 
From equations (1) and (3) the probability of choosing a particular foreign currency is: 
 
(4)   P(firm i chooses currency j)    
  = P[(i chooses j| i chooses foreign currency)]*P[i chooses foreign currency]  













FC)],        
 
where Ii





Using full information maximum likelihood on (4) and the corresponding equation for the domestic 




FC and  
DC.
10 The variable Ii
FC is called inclusive value and is the utility 
derived from having available all alternatives in the foreign currency branch. If the coefficient of this 
inclusive value  
FC = 1, the IIA holds for all alternatives, and the complete decision may be modelled 
using a conditional logit. We use this information as an additional test for the correct model 
specification.  
 
In practice the estimation of a nested logit model requires a completely balanced panel data set. We 
do not have sufficient observations to run a nested logit using all firms. Therefore we present 
estimates from the nested logit model for the subsample of US companies, which comprise the largest 
and the most complete subset of the data, allowing for a balanced panel structure.  
 
As discussed above, strategic as well as cost considerations figure into a firm’s decision to issue debt. 
We do not explicitly account for dynamic effects. For example, it may be argued that a firm that 
issued a bond in euros may be more likely to issue in euros again. In particular, after the introduction 
of the euro initially shy firms may have become more confident in choosing the euro based on 
previous experience or general market sentiment. This question is beyond the scope of this study and 
is left for future research.  
 
4.  Bond Issues and Company-Level Data 
 
To permit an empirical investigation of the currency decision in bond issuance, we created a new 
bond issue database from different sources. Firm-level balance sheet data, drawn from Van Dijk’s 16
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Osiris database, were matched with bond issuance data from Thompson Financial and linked with 
macroeconomic data from the IMF and the BIS. This high level of disaggregation of the data was 
needed to gain insights into the issuance process and the currency decision at the level of each single 
issue. We are interested in the interplay between the supply and the demand side of the bond market. 
Firm-level characteristics as well as macroeconomic variables influence both sides of the market. The 
data cover the period 1999 to 2003, i.e. the first five years after the introduction of the euro. 
The final dataset is the result of a multi-staged selection process (Table 1). Company data from the 
Osiris database, featuring almost 25,000 companies worldwide, marked the starting point of the 
exercise. From this set, active industrial companies listed on a stock exchange and domiciled in 
developed economies according to the IMF definition were selected. This yielded 16,500 companies.  
Many firms in the sample had a single shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the shares, 
indicating that these companies might be subsidiaries of the respective shareholder.
11 Subsidiaries, 
however, are likely to decide on the issuance of international bonds, including the preferred currency, 
in close coordination with the holding company. Thus, it could be misleading to link bond issuances 
by these companies with the respective balance sheet data, as in fact the holding company’s 
characteristics would be more appropriate to explain the financing decisions taken by the subsidiary. 
For example, data on a subsidiary may indicate strong financing needs, which would be attenuated by 
a bond issuance if the firm were a stand-alone company. As a subsidiary of another company, such 
financing needs may be fulfilled by transfers from the parent company instead. For these reasons, 
companies with a single shareholder holding more than 50% of the shares were withdrawn from the 
sample, reducing the number of companies to 9,760.  
The remaining sample included many companies that are small in terms of assets and/or numbers of 
employees. To keep data manageable, firms from the first quartile of the distribution by total assets in 
US dollar terms in any year and of employees in at least one year were discarded.
12 Applying these 
criteria produced a sample of 4,424 companies. To guarantee continuity in the reported data, 
companies with less than three years of consecutive balance sheet data were removed from this initial 
set, reducing the total number of companies to 1,711.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 In this case the domestic nest in the estimation is degenerate as it includes only one currency (but a different 
one across firms). 
11 Firms have been selected from the A+ through B- category of independence according to the Osiris 
‘ownership data’ definition, where A means “no shareholders recorded with more than 24.9% direct or total 
ownership”; B means “no shareholders recorded with more than 49.9% direct or total ownership. One or more 
shareholders recorded with more than 24.9% direct or total ownership”. 
12 In terms of assets, company size in the final sample ranges from USD 91,000 to USD 180 billion. In terms of 
employment, company size ranges from ten to 1.5 million employees. 17
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Table 1: Overview of information available in Bond and Firm Level Databases 
  Number of firms  Number of bond 
issues 
Industrial companies in Osiris database   24,883   - 
Listed, active, companies in adv. Economies  16,500  - 
Largest shareholder owns less than 50 %  9,760  - 
2
nd to 4
th quartile in assets in all years  5,464  - 
2
nd to 4
th quartile in employees in one year  4,424  - 
Three consecutive years of balance sheet data  1,711   
Active issuers in 1999 – 2003  2,471  12,210 
Matched bond issue and balance sheet data  1,586  9,233 
  of which:      
  Located & issuing in US, euro area, Japan, UK 1,496  8,361 
 Domestic  issues  1,468  7,461 
  M&A activity related to bond issue  921  5,295 
 Subsidiary  information  1,383 8,448 
Source: Van Dijk Osiris and Thomson ONE databases, and authors’ calculations. 
In a second step, the company data from Van Dijk’s Osiris database were combined with bond issue 
data from Thomson Financial. According to this source, a total of 12,210 bonds were issued by 2,471 
companies domiciled in industrial countries over the period 1999 – 2003. Matching issue data with 
firm level information resulted in 9,233 issues from 1,586 firms. Thus, on average each company 
included in the sample issued slightly more than one bond per year over the review period. Average 
bond duration is 9.4 years, with the bulk of issues lying in the five to ten years range and reaching up 
to fifty years. Note that there are three possible definitions of international bonds (Detken and 
Hartmann, 2000). The “narrow” definition of international bonds refers to debt securities issued in a 
currency other than the home currency of the borrower. The “broad” measure adds to the “narrow” 
measure the issuance of debt securities denominated in the home currency of the borrower provided 
that it is targeted at international investors (e.g. through a syndicate of banks). This paper focuses 
instead on the “global” definition of international bond, which also includes all domestic issues 
targeted at the domestic market. 
Table 2 provides information on the geographical distribution of the companies issuing bonds covered 
by the sample (column 1), the currency distribution of bonds issued (column 2), and the number of 
domestic bonds issued by companies of the respective countries (column 3). It reveals that the sample 
has a regional bias towards the United States, accounting for more than 50 percent of all issues (4,727 
out of 9,233 issues). The bias towards the US currency is even more pronounced, as 5,443 issues are 
denominated in the US dollar. 1,630 bonds were issued in yen, while 1,060 were denominated in euro. 
Relating the number of domestic issues to the number of bonds issued by companies in the respective 
country provides a measure of home bias in issuance. It is particularly strong in the US, as 4,490 18
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issues out of a total of 4,727, i.e. 95% of US companies’ issues were denominated in US dollar. By 
contrast, firms from the euro area chose the euro in only 52% of the cases (744 out of 1,428).  
Table 2: Distribution of issues by issuer domicile and currency 
Country / Currency 
Number of bonds 
issued by companies 
from  
Number of bonds 
issued in currency 
Number of domestic 
issues by companies 
from 
US / USD  4,727  5,443  4,490 
Japan / JPY  1,563  1,630  1,449 
Euro area / EUR  1,428  1,060  744 
UK / GBP  484  302  191 
Korea / KRW  311  296  278 
Taiwan / TWD  252  210  206 
Canada / CAD  197  60  30 
Switzerland / CHF  89  83  36 
Sweden / SEK  58  5  2 
Australia / AUD  50  90  24 
Singapore / SGD  26  25  8 
Hong Kong / HKD  21  21  3 
Norway / NOK  15  6  0 
Denmark / DKK  10  2  0 
Israel / ILS  2  0  0 
All countries / currencies 9,233  9,233  7,461 
Source: Thomson ONE databases, and authors’ calculations 
As the number of observations is very small for several countries, the full dataset would not yield 
reliable econometric results. At the same time, the predominant part of total issues, or 91% out of 
9,233 were issued in the four main currencies by firms domiciled in the euro area, the US, the UK, or 
Japan. Similarly, most firms (1,496 out of 1,711) are located in these four regions. Accordingly, the 
focus of the empirical exercise lies on firms that issue in the four main currencies and are domiciled in 
the US, the euro area, the UK, or Japan, leading to a total of 8,022 issues (Table 3).  
Table 3: Distribution of bond issuance by country and currency in the four main regions 
Region EUR  GBP  USD  JPY  Total 
Euro  area  744 54  441 92  1331 
United  Kingdom  124 191 107  40 462 
United States  101  49 4,490  35 4,675 
Japan 14  2  89  1,449  1,554 
Total  983  296 5,127 1,616 8,022 
Source: Thomson ONE databases, and authors’ calculations 19
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A closer look at this group of bonds reveals that for all four currencies, the largest share of issuance 
comes from the domestic market (the main diagonal in Table 3). In all regions outside the euro area, 
euro area residents are the second most important issuers in terms of bonds issued over the period 
under consideration (row 1). For the euro as an issuing currency (column 1), UK resident firms are the 
most important non-resident issuers, accounting for 124 out of 983, or one-eighth of all euro-
denominated issues.  
4.1.  Empirical  Variables 
 
The following variables were used to capture the effects discussed in section 2. The empirical 
variables and expected signs of the respective coefficients are collected in table 4. 
Table 4: Empirical proxies and expected signs 
Variable Proxy  Expected  effect  on the probability of 
choosing a foreign currency  
Interest rate costs  Duration  ? 
Exchange rate costs (hedging)  Share of subsidiaries in currency area  + 
  M&A activity in target area in the past 
6 months 
+ 
Exchange rate costs (risk)  Past volatility vs home currency  –  
Regulation Principal  + 
Transaction costs  Bond market capitalisation  + 
Strategic supply  Total firm assets  + 
Reputation/leverage  Total liabilities/total assets  + 
Investor demand  Deposits/GDP  + 
 
Concerning interest rate costs (section 2.1), we consider the duration of the bond as an important 
influence on the choice of currency. Since corporate bonds tend to be priced off the government yield 
curve the duration of corporate bonds in a currency area is likely to follow the expansion of the 
government curve. Particularly for longer duration, a liquid benchmark is instrumental for issuing a 
corporate bond. Hence, the duration of corporate bonds will tend to mirror the duration of the 
government curve. In other words, a firm is more likely to issue a bond with long duration in a 
currency area with long duration of the government bond curve.  
Long-term risks that may raise foreign exchange costs (section 2.2) were represented by subsidiaries 
and M&A activity abroad. Since comparable data on subsidiaries’ assets are unavailable for all 
countries in our sample, the share of subsidiaries in a given currency area over the total number of 
subsidiaries (including the subsidiaries in the home country) is used as a proxy for hedging motives. 
Even though the number of subsidiaries does not necessarily proxy for the absolute exposure to a 
currency, this variable captures the relative significance of one currency as opposed to another for the 
firm. More subsidiaries in a currency area are expected to raise FCDD in that currency.  20
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It is noteworthy that the number of subsidiaries in a currency area may also capture the firm’s ability 
to issue in that currency, as more subsidiaries signal a larger presence of the firm in the market of 
issuance. Investors are more likely to be familiar with the firm or to have interacted with some of the 
subsidiaries. More “air time” may increase the firm’s perceived creditworthiness in that market. 
According to market participants, firms frequently issue bonds to finance M&A activity (cf. also De 
Bondt and Marqués, 2004). To account for this fact, we consider the mergers and acquisitions in 
which the companies have engaged in the country of the issue currency as another proxy for foreign 
exposure. We collect information on M&A activity from Thomson Financial.
13 
Experts from the industry have indicated that firms usually finance an acquisition with a short-term 
bank loan of up to one year. Following the acquisition the loan is then refinanced by debt issuance; 
most issues are completed within six months of the acquisition. Firms may receive a different rating in 
the aftermath of an acquisition, which may necessitate a road show to advertise the bond issue.
14 As 
the process takes time we allow for a lag between the merger and the bond issue. However, firms 
acquire other firms frequently. In order to avoid attributing too many issues to the same merger or 
vice versa, we allow a 6-month window after the merger during which we consider all bond issues 
potentially motivated by it. We match a bond issue with a corresponding merger or acquisition if the 
bond has been issued up to six months after the merger or acquisition.  
It is not uncommon for the same company to engage in more than one acquisition in the same month 
or even on the same day. For example, in December 1999 Rentokil bought eight companies in seven 
countries. To avoid double-counting of such transactions, we group M&A transactions within months. 
Thus, if a company has acquired three other companies within the same month and has also issued a 
bond over the next six months, we match the bond issue with all three acquisitions. To account for the 
size of the M&A transaction, we sum the values of the three M&As. In order to understand whether 
the currency of bond issuance depends on the region of the M&A, we create a dummy that is equal to 
one for the currency area of each of the targeted companies.  
As regards exchange rate risk, firms are likely to take into consideration exchange rate volatility as a 
measure of the risk premium. Firms are assumed to take into consideration past volatilities 
represented by the annual variance of the local currency against the currency of issuance. Exchange 
rate volatility is a measure of the risk premium and we expect a negative influence of foreign 
exchange volatility on FCDD.  
                                                           
13 1,349 of the 1,586 companies in the sample have pursued merger and acquisition activities during the period 
1999-2003. During these four years, the average firm acquired more than eight other firms bringing the total 
number of M&A transactions to 13,962. For about half of these transactions (6,793), Thomson also provides the 
value of the transaction, corresponding to 1,251 companies. 
14 We are grateful to Scott Lampard for explaining to us the details of M&A financing. 21
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A direct measure of transaction costs (section 2.3) is available only for a small subsample. As a proxy, 
we assumed transaction costs to depend negatively on bond market size. Hence, total bond market 
capitalisation in the region of issuance was used, which ought to have a stimulating effect on FCDD.
15 
A remark is in order concerning reverse causality of bond market capitalisation. Since the dependent 
variable in our estimation is a discrete choice variable and not the size of the bond issue, we do not 
consider the effect of other firms’ choice on bond market capitalisation to be important. To confirm 
this, we calculated the correlation of bond market capitalisation with the principal amount of the issue 
and found that the correlation is significantly negative in Japan (-0.30), the UK (-0.81) and the euro 
area (-0.23), while it is significantly positive in the US (0.64). Note that this may indicate that large 
bond issues in the US raise the bond market capitalisation there rather than high market liquidity 
being an attraction to issue in US dollar.
16  
We represent differing regulation and tax treatments across countries by country dummies, as a 
representation of these effects at the macroeconomic level appears intrinsically difficult. At the 
microeconomic level, the decision to issue in a foreign currency should depend on the size of a bond 
issue, since issuing abroad involves fixed costs, such as legal costs, or road showing the issue. This 
may make it uneconomical to issue in smaller size in foreign currency. Hence, we incorporate the 
principal amount of each bond issue and expect a positive relation between the principal amount of a 
bond issue and choice to issue in foreign currency. 
Strategic supply and demand effects (section 2.4) consist of several parts. Demand effects, i.e. the 
effects of a larger investor base in a region, are measured by deposits per GDP in the target area. We 
also use firm leverage as an indication for the firm’s reputation. A remark is in order concerning 
reverse causality of this variable, as firms’ choice of currency may affect the decision to whether to 
issue bonds or equity. However, talks with market participants assured us that the choice of debt 
issuance is taken prior to the choice of currency (cf. the decision tree in figure 1). Hence, the choice of 
currency does not affect firm leverage. 
5.  Empirical Results 
 
Following the estimation structure suggested in section 3, this section starts by presenting the factors 
influencing the choice between domestic and foreign currency. Second, we present determinants of 
the choice among different foreign currencies including a dummy variable to capture domestic bond 
issuance. A third part presents results from a nested logit model for US companies, assuming that the 
decision-tree takes the form in Figure 1, where the first level decision is between domestic and foreign 
currencies and the second level decision is between the different foreign currencies. Test results 
                                                           
15 Alternatively, a negative relation between bond market capitalisation and bond issuance in that market could 
indicate saturation of a market. 
16 However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that the choice between public (stocks and bonds) and private 
financing (bank loans) reflects the fact that bank-oriented systems tend to have illiquid capital markets. 22
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corroborate the need for a nested structure. This model is estimated using the full-information 
maximum likelihood estimator implemented in Stata.  
5.1.   Domestic vs. Foreign Issuance 
 
Consider the choice of domestic against foreign currency without regard to the particular foreign 
currency chosen. In terms of Figure 1, this means looking at the first level of the firm’s choice only. 
Table 5 gives the logit estimates together with standard errors, which are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
The lower part of the table shows the pseudo-R
2, which measures the improvement of the regression 
fit against a regression on a constant only.  
 
The dependant variable is a dummy that assumes a value of one if the firm issues in foreign currency, 
and zero otherwise. In this binary model, the share of subsidiaries is specified as the share of all 
foreign subsidiaries over the total number of subsidiaries. Similarly, the M&A dummy represents all 
M&A activity abroad during the six months prior to the bond issue.  
 
Exposure to foreign currency risk as measured by the proportion of foreign subsidiaries contributes to 
the choice of a foreign currency. The results confirm the hypotheses put forward in previous studies 
that more geographically diversified firms are more likely to use foreign currencies to issue bonds for 
hedging purposes.  
 
Second, M&A activity abroad has a significant influence on bond issuance in foreign currency. 
However, bond issuance to support M&A activity abroad is not limited to the currency of the foreign 
company which is being acquired. Firms also issue bonds in their domestic currency even when 
acquiring foreign companies. This finding is supported by the fact that the largest share of issuance is 
in domestic currency for all four currencies considered (Table 3). Third, the results suggest that larger 
corporate bond market capitalisation in the target region positively influences FCDD issuance. 
Assuming that larger bond markets may be linked with lower transaction costs, this corroborates the 
notion that lower transaction costs may be an incentive to issue in foreign currency. 
 23
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Table 5: Logit estimates for the choice between issuance in domestic and foreign currency. 
 
   1 2 3 4  5 
Share of Subsidiaries  6.20    6.40    6.18 
  (0.26)  (0.27)   (0.26) 
M&A dummy    0.29 0.27    
   (0.05)  (0.06)    
Bond market capitalisation      1.50   
      (0.30)   
Log(Total assets)  0.18 0.15 0.18 0.14  0.17 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) 
Deposits/GDP       0.07 
              (0.08) 
Number of Observations  7781 7781 7781 7781  7739 
Pseudo-R
2  0.55 0.33 0.55 0.34  0.54 
Log-pseudo-likelihood  -1498 -2211 -1486 -2190  -1489 
Note: The dependant variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm issues in foreign currency and 0 for domestic 
currency. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Parameters that 
are significant at the 5%-level are shown in bold type. 
 
Considering strategic effects, supply side considerations appear to have a bearing on the currency 
decision. Larger firm size has a positive effect on the probability of issuing in foreign currency, 
confirming the hypothesis that firms may need to tap a foreign bond market due to limitations of the 
domestic market. Firm size may also act as a proxy for reputation outside the domestic market. Larger 
firms may be better known abroad, easing access and lowering borrowing costs in foreign bond 
markets. By contrast, higher domestic deposits per GDP in the country of the issue currency do not 
raise the likelihood of issuing FCDD. While the coefficient on this variable is positive as expected, it 
is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 6 expands the explanatory variables list and considers possible borrowing constraints on the 
firm side. The effect of firm leverage on FCDD is positive and significant in model 1 (but negative 
and insignificant in model 2), supporting the notion that firms that have exhausted the possibilities of 
the local market are more likely to issue debt abroad. This may reflect an attempt to diversify the 
investor base to avoid a simultaneous removal of invested funds in reaction to a macroeconomic or 
financial shock to the economy. We tend to prefer models 1, 3, and 5 to models 2, 4 and 6, as they 
have a considerably better fit (larger R
2 and log-likelihood). As the effect is not always significant 
however, the results do not permit firm conclusions.  
 
Models 3 to 6 include two measures for constraints when minimising borrowing costs, the duration of 
the bond and the principal amount of the issue. We find a negative effect of bond duration on issuing 
in foreign currency. This may reflect the difficulty in swapping receipts from FCDD into domestic 24
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currency. Bond issue size has a varying but always significant effect beyond a firm’s foreign exposure 
(models 5 and 6). We regard the positive coefficient of model 5 (which we consider more reliable 
than model 6) as a tentative indication that firms reflect a large fixed cost block of FCDD by only 
considering FCDD for large issues. 
Table 6: Logit estimates including borrowing constraints. 
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Share of Subsidiaries  6.30    6.20    6.30   
 (0.26)    (0.26)    (0.26)   
M&A dummy    0.29    0.31    0.26 
   (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05) 
Log(Total assets)  0.20 0.15 0.16  0.13  0.17  0.18 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Log(Duration)     -0.26 -0.40    
     (0.06)  (0.05)     
Log(Leverage)  1.50  -0.05        
 (0.33)  (0.25)         
Log(Principal)         0.04 -0.13 
               (0.02)  (0.03) 
Number of Observations  7781  7781  7684  7684  7781  7781 
Pseudo-R
2 0.55  0.33  0.55  0.34  0.55  0.34 
Log-pseudo-likelihood -1485  -2211  -1476  -2163  -1498  -2199 
Note: see Table 5 
  
5.2.   Currency Choice of Foreign Issuance 
 
Now assume that all currencies, including the domestic one, are equivalent to the firm. If there were 
perfect hedging opportunities and the transaction costs were equivalent between currencies, the firm 
should be indifferent between its “home” currency and any other alternative. A conditional logit 
model works on the basis of this theoretical assumption. The decision tree has only one branch and as 
many twigs as the number of currencies (including the domestic one). Table 7 gives the results of the 
conditional logit estimation. The default currency is the US dollar, hence all odds ratios reflect the 
probabilities that firms choose a given other currency (euro, pound, or yen) over the dollar.
17 Note that 
the sample size has increased by a factor of four, because also in this model rejections are considered 
as decisions, i.e. a firm that issues bonds in euros does not issue in yen, sterling, or dollars.  
 
We test whether the domestic currency has a special significance by including a dummy variable, 
which assumes a value of one whenever the currency of issue is the home currency of the issuer’s 
parent firm, and zero otherwise. We test for the significance of the coefficient on the “domestic” 
                                                           
17 The choice of base currency is a matter of representation; the results do not depend on the base currency. 25
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dummy to evaluate the hypothesis that all currencies are considered equal in the decision process of 
the firms. In all specifications, the domestic dummy is large and significant, indicating a strong “home 
bias” in bond issuance. The regressions also include choice-specific intercepts, which are significant 
in some specifications. In particular, the pound is less likely to be chosen as issuance currency than 
the dollar, while the euro is a more likely choice.
18 The lower part of the table looks at influencing 
variables’ effects on choosing one particular currency. However, the coefficients are not stable and 
not significant across specifications. 
 
The conditional logit model includes both currency-level and issue-level variables. While the first set 
of variables has the same effect across currencies, the effect of the latter differs between currency 
areas. Issue-level variables capture the interaction of firm or issue-level characteristics with each one 
of the currencies considered. Negative coefficients signal a lower likelihood to prefer a given currency 
to the dollar, while positive ones indicate an increased probability vis-à-vis the US currency, 
independently of the other alternatives available, including the domestic one. 
 
Firm exposure in a given currency increases the probability of issuing debt in that currency relative to 
the US dollar. The results hold with both proxies for exposure – the fraction of subsidiaries abroad 
and the M&A activity. This gives additional support to the hypothesis that hedging is an important 
consideration in the firm’s decision process. A notable exception is the UK pound. Insignificant and 
negative coefficients signal that foreign M&A activity does not drive issuance in that currency. 
Similarly, the share of foreign subsidiaries appears to be insignificant as a driver for euro issuance. 
Having more subsidiaries may also contribute to having a reputation in a given market, which may 
blur the distinction between the hedging motive and the firm’s ability to issue in a currency due to its 
perceived creditworthiness in that market.  
 
As expected, we find that higher currency volatility reduces the likelihood of FCDD. Firms appear to 
take past currency movements into account when considering the risk of issuing bonds in a non-
domestic currency. 
 
Looking at the currency break down for the principal amount and duration of the issue on the choice 
of currency shows considerable cross-currency differences. Firms prefer to issue larger bonds in a 
non-dollar currency. In particular, the largest bond issues tend to take place in euro but also pound and 
yen are preferred for large issues to the dollar. This supports the view that issuing abroad involves 
substantial fixed costs. Fixed transaction costs are likely a result of legal advice concerning disclosure 
and taxation issues as well as of road showing to overcome information asymmetries. Hence, larger 
issues of FCDD are more likely to be economical. 
                                                           
18 A concern may be that these constants capture a large part of the variation. The pseudo-R
2 in Tables 7 and 10 
compares our model with one including the choice-specific constants only. Specifically, the pseudo-R
2 is one 
minus the ratio of the log-likelihoods of the two models (McFadden, 1974)  26
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Columns 6 and 7 in table 7 also suggest that a longer duration increases the chances of issuing in US 
dollar over the euro and yen, while the pound sterling is preferred for even longer durations. The 
coefficients reflect the duration is the underlying government bond markets. Average duration for 
government bonds is longest in the UK, shorter in the US and shortest in the euro area and Japan. As 
corporate bond issuance tends to use the sovereign market as a benchmark, the effect of duration on 
issuing in different currencies reflects market idiosyncrasies due to the established treasury markets in 
each currency area. 
 
Bond market capitalisation of a currency region – which we interpret as lower transaction costs – 
appears to be unimportant for the decision in which currency to issue. The coefficients are all 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Considering strategic effects, larger company size contributes to the probability of issuing in USD, as 
across all specifications larger firms prefer the dollar against all three alternative currencies. The size 
and prominence of the US financial markets may be a reason to issue debt in dollars. Deposits per 
GDP have a positive coefficient in all the specifications, although not significantly so. Firm leverage 
(not shown) supports significantly issues in yen, likely a result of Japanese firms displaying high 
leverage by international standards, or reflecting a demand for foreign debt by Japanese investors 
willing to diversify. 27
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Table 7: Conditional logit estimates for choosing between foreign currencies.  
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
JPY constant  -0.02  0.00  0.85  -0.18 -0.54 -0.64 1.08 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.43) (0.58) (0.52) (0.59) 
GBP constant  -1.58 -1.68 -0.94 -2.31 -3.98 -3.45 -7.77 
  (0.31) (0.30) (0.26) (1.65) (2.20) (1.99) (2.01) 
EUR constant  0.92 0.86 1.49 0.76  0.91 -1.99 -1.32 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.43) (0.43) (0.34) (0.37) 
Domestic dummy  2.53 2.08 2.14 2.53 1.89 2.00 2.18 
  (0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
Volatility   -0.66 -1.12    -0.77 -0.65 -0.48 
   (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Deposits/GDP       0.78  0.09  0.44 
         ( 0 . 5 3) (0.50) (0.50) 
Bond market capitalisation        -0.22  0.26     
      (0.48)  (0.53)    
Subsidiary share x JPY  3.06 2.87    3.06 2.61 2.57 3.03 
  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) 
Subsidiary share x GBP  0.52 0.75    0.52 1.03 0.82 0.71 
  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) 
Subsidiary share x EUR  0.30  0.32    0.30  0.37  0.40  0.08 
  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) 
M&A dummy x JPY      2.66    2.09 2.09 2.34 
     (0.72)  (0.72) (0.72) (0.73) 
M&A dummy x GBP      -0.23  -0.38  -0.41 -0.11 
     (0.39)  (0.41) (0.41) (0.50) 
M&A dummy x EUR      1.64    1.70 1.41 1.33 
     (0.24)  (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
Log(total assets) x JPY  -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Log(total assets) x GBP  -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log(total assets) x EUR  -0.17 -0.16 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Principal  x  JPY        0.10 0.14 
        ( 0 . 0 4 )   ( 0 . 0 4 )  
Principal  x  GBP        0.26
  0.20
 
        ( 0 . 0 6 )   ( 0 . 0 6 )  
Principal  x  EUR        0.51 0.57 
        ( 0 . 0 4 )   ( 0 . 0 4 )  
Duration  x  JPY         -0.73 
         ( 0 . 0 8 )  
Duration  x  GBP         1.26 
         ( 0 . 1 1 )  
Duration  x  EUR         -0.44 
         ( 0 . 0 7 )  
Number  of  Observations  29968 29261 31342 29968 27122 27122 26774 
Pseudo-R
2  0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 
Log-pseudo-likelihood  -3275.8 -3201.9 -3350.8 -3275.7 -2992.7 2872.0 -2693.4 
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the currency choice. The estimated outcome is the 
probability of choosing a given currency (euro, yen, or pound) over the US dollar. All regressions include country 
and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. 28
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5.3.   Currency Choice in Bond Issuance by US Companies 
 
This section reports results from a nested logit specification applied to US companies. This model 
estimates the complete decision tree in figure 1. The domestic currency is the USD and the foreign 
currencies are the euro, the yen and the pound sterling. Here we only consider US-based firms, which 
form the largest subset of the data that form a balanced panel. We cannot credibly compare the results 
from the previous estimations with those reported in this section since the sample is very different. 
Table 10 in the appendix reports the output from the conditional logit estimation for the restricted 
sample of US companies.  
  
The decision to issue in the domestic rather than the foreign currency is influenced by the 
characteristics of the firm and the currencies’ attributes. As opposed to the conditional logit model, in 
the nested logit specification the choice between the euro, yen and sterling is assumed independent of 
each other, but not of the attributes of the dollar, as it is the domestic currency. In terms of Figure 1, 
recall that here the IIA hypothesis holds between twigs but not between branches. This implies that 
the choice of any foreign currency is not independent from the alternative twig ‘domestic’, while 
under the twig ‘foreign’, the probability of choosing e.g. euro against yen is independent of the pound, 
the other ‘foreign currency’ in the same twig. 
 
Table 8 reports the coefficient estimates and standard errors from the nested logit model. The 
coefficients show how each variable affects the probability that US firms issue domestic bonds versus 
foreign bonds, where the set of foreign currency alternatives includes euro, yen and sterling. A 
Hausman/McFadden (1984) likelihood ratio test for the nesting (heteroscedasticity) against the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity (no need for nesting) is reported at the bottom of the table. The test 
compares the likelihood of a non-nested conditional logit model with the nested logit model. In all 
cases, test results support the use of the nested logit, confirming the observation from the conditional 
logit estimation that the domestic currency is unconditionally preferred to other currencies. 
 
The decision to issue in foreign currency is influenced by two sets of coefficients: (a) the firm-specific 
characteristics apply at the first decision level affecting the probability of choosing foreign versus 
domestic. In terms of equation (4), this corresponds to P[i chooses foreign currency]; (b) the currency-
specific characteristics apply instead to the bottom level of the decision tree (Figure 1), affecting the 
probabilities of choosing a certain foreign currency once the foreign branch has been chosen at the 
first level. In terms of equation (4), this corresponds to: P[(i chooses j| i chooses foreign currency)]. 
 
As in previous models, hedging motives appear again as a prominent factor for determining FCDD 
issuance. The coefficients for foreign subsidiaries and in most cases, M&A activity abroad are highly 29
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significant and sizeable, underlining the finding that hedging motives are predominant considerations 
for FCDD issuance. If a firm has high share of subsidiaries or M&A activity in a given currency, this 
positively affects the choice of this currency for FCDD issuance. By contrast, lower transaction costs 
measured by bond market capitalisation raise the probability to issue bonds in a given foreign 
currency significantly only in some cases. 
Table 8: Nested logit model for US firms. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5  6  7 
Bond  market  capitalisation  0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
Deposits/GDP          -0.07 
          (0.06) 
Share of Subsidiaries  3.18 2.94 2.91 3.20    3.40  3.50 
  (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)    (0.33)  (0.38) 
M&A dummy    0.57  0.30  0.62 1.05   0.34 
   (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.18)    (0.21) 
Log(Total  assets)  -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.04  -0.14  -0.04 -0.05 
 0.03  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Log(Leverage)     0.87  1.89 1.93 1.88 2.33 
     (0.48)  (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.46)  (0.55) 
Log(Principal)       0.39 0.31 0.40 0.43 
       (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Log(Duration)       -0.16  -0.28  -0.14 -0.19 
         (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
           
Number of observations  17548  17548  17548 17216 18280  17216  13888 
Log-pseudo-likelihood -856.3  -851.5  -849.8  -811.1  -915.5  -816.8  -691.1 
LR test: Chi
2(1)  132.1 138.1 107.6 134.6 67.3 130.0  122.2 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the currency choice. The estimated outcome is the effect 
on the probability of choosing any given foreign currency (euro, yen, or pound) over the domestic currency US 
dollar. Standard errors in parentheses. The Chi
2 LR test is the Hausman/MacFadden (1984) test of the IIA 
hypothesis. The test is based on the idea that if a subset of the choice set is truly irrelevant with respect to the 
other alternatives, omitting it from the model will not lead to inconsistent estimates. The 95 percent critical 
value of Chi2(1) is 3.84. 
 
On the strategic side, the direction of influence of firm assets on FCDD is ambiguous. The exclusion 
of subsidiaries raises the significance of total assets’ coefficients, as was the case in the conditional 
logit estimation. This may indicate that both variables are partially capturing the same effect. The 
negative sign of total assets suggests that bigger US firms prefer to issue US dollar denominated 
bonds, reflecting the larger market size for US dollar denominated bonds. 
 
Looking at the effects of market structures on the choice of currency, the duration of the bond 
appears to be an impediment to FCDD. This is in line with the previous results of table 6, reflecting 
the fact that US companies choose the currency of issuance considering the duration of the 
underlying sovereign bond markets. Alternatively, the negative coefficients of the variable ‘duration’ 30
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might be interpreted as a sign of lower confidence in the strength of the US dollar given that the 
results refer to US companies. However, the results from Table 10 in the appendix support the first 
explanation but not the latter one. 
 
The positive effect of the principal amount of the bond issue on the probability to issue in foreign 
currency corroborates earlier finding for US firms. They react to fixed costs of issuing abroad, which 
result from differing regulatory frameworks and information costs, which imply that issuers have to 
engage in road showing when issuing abroad. 
 
Finally, firm leverage appears to raise the likelihood to issue FCDD, supporting the idea that US 
credit constrained firms may find it easier to borrow abroad. This is in line with the earlier results for 
the whole sample that have suggested increased yen issuance by leveraged companies. With regard to 
the previously quoted contradictory findings whether credit constrained firms tend to borrow more in 
foreign market or are unable to do so, our dataset appears to support the hypothesis that credit 
constrained firms are more likely to borrow from international bond markets than in their home 
market. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Starting from the observation that the use of the euro as a financing currency in international bond 
markets has increased between 1999 and 2003, this paper contributes to understanding this movement 
by investigating the driving factors behind firms’ decision to issue foreign currency denominated 
debt. Based on a new dataset at the single bond issue level for the period 1999 – 2003, we analyse the 
determinants of currency choice in bond issuance by corporations in developed economies. 
 
The research design split the question in two parts, the firm’s choice to issue bonds in foreign as 
opposed to domestic currency and the choice between several foreign currencies. The choice between 
domestic and foreign currency appears to be determined by the attempt to hedge foreign exposure. In 
addition, strategic considerations for diversifying the investor base may lead in particular large 
companies to issue in foreign currency. Large firms may also face constraints in raising funds in their 
local markets and may have a better reputation internationally. For both reasons, larger companies 
appear to be more active in international bond issuance.  
 
The choice between foreign currencies, including the euro, yields similar results. As before, cost 
effects and strategic considerations appear to influence the firm’s decision. For FCDD issuance these 
results imply that the main motivations underlying the decision to issue bonds in a particular currency 
are the attempt to hedge firms’ foreign exposure, as the proxies used for foreign exposure are 31
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significant and with the expected sign. At the same time, we do not find evidence for the effort of 
some issuers to broaden their investor base into countries with a higher deposit to GDP ratio.  
 
The paper also finds support for the notion that bond issue characteristics, including issue principal 
amount and duration, influence the decision in which currency to issue. A larger bond size tends to be 
associated with issues in euro, pound and yen, while smaller issues are predominantly done in dollars. 
This is in line with the notion that regulatory differences and information asymmetries impose costs 
that make it uneconomical to issue in smaller size in foreign currency. 
 
Our results also suggest that longer duration may make it expensive to swap foreign proceeds into 
domestic currency. Alternatively, this result may be interpreted as a sign of lower confidence in the 
strength of the US dollar against the euro over the long-term. More importantly, the break down into 
currency effects shows that duration is closely associated with the average duration of the underlying 
government bond markets. Market idiosyncrasies appear to play an important role when deciding the 
currency of issuance.  
 
From a company perspective, the results suggest that the firm’s choice of currency is influenced by 
both macroeconomic factors and microeconomic considerations. On the macroeconomic side, the size 
of the domestic market appears to affect the firm’s ability to issue domestically and may support the 
case for foreign versus domestic currency when issuing a bond. On the microeconomic side, factors 
such as firm size, the firm’s exposure to a currency area, as well as issue size and bond duration, have 
a bearing on the currency choice of bond issuance. 32
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Table 9: Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Variable Definition/  unit    Source 
Total Assets  (thousand USD)    Osiris 
Deposits  Deposits held by commercial banks 
and OFIs (local currency) 
  IMF, IFS annual data 
M&A issue abroad  1 if M&A in target country within 
0/1-2/3-6/0-6 months 
 Thomson  Financial 
Exposure  Number of subsidiaries in target 
country 
 Osiris 
Principal amount  Issue size (million USD)    Thomson Financial 
Bond market 
capitalisation 
Domestic bond market debt issued 
in domestic currency targeted at 
residents (USD) 
 BIS  International 
Capital Market 
Statistics 
GDP  Nominal GDP (local currency/in 
USD) 





Long-term government bond yield 
differential (percentage points) 
  IMF, IFS monthly data 
Leverage  Ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. 
 Osiris 
Duration  Maturity date minus issue date 
(days) 
 Thomson  Financial 
Eurobond  1 if market area is “Euro” and 
private placement is “yes” 
 Thomson  Financial 
EBITDA  (thousand USD)    Osiris 
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    1 2 3 4 5 6 
JPY constant  -4.24  -4.83  -6.52  -3.90  -5.89  -5.47 
  (0.87)  (1.00)  (1.15)  (1.32)  (1.58)  (1.38) 
GBP constant  -4.25  -4.57  -13.73  -7.51  -22.01  -6.54 
  (0.77)  (0.81)  (3.23)  (1.23)  (4.46)  (3.37) 
EUR constant  -5.29  -5.71  -7.74  -6.50  -8.43  -7.67 
  (0.64)  (0.73)  (1.04)  (0.93)  (1.26)  (0.89) 
FX Volatility    0.70    0.81  0.74  0.79 
   (0.52)    (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.54) 
Deposits/GDP       1.14  0.36 
         (1.05)  (0.90) 
Bond market capitalisation      -2.90    -2.27   
     (0.96)    (1.09)   
Share of subsidiaries x JPY  13.97  14.35  13.85  14.34  15.33  15.42 
  (8.65)  (8.62)  (8.61)  (8.91)  (8.83)  (8.71) 
Share of subsidiaries x GBP  3.48  3.48  3.58  3.39  3.80  3.63 
  (0.63)  (0.63)  (0.62)  (0.69)  (0.72)  (0.61) 
Share of subsidiaries x EUR  4.24  4.22  4.32  4.28  4.05  4.13 
  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.48) 
Log(Leverage) x JPY        -0.93    
       (1.04)    
Log(Leverage) x GBP        3.10    
       (0.76)    
Log(Leverage) x EUR        1.01    
       (0.63)    
Log(total assets) x JPY  -0.04  -0.04  -0.05  -0.06  -0.17  -0.16 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Log(total assets) x GBP  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06  -0.10  -0.09 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Log(total assets) x EUR  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.00 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Principal x JPY          0.33  0.40 
       (0.14)  (0.14) 
Principal x GBP          0.30
  0.19
 
       (0.10)  (0.10) 
Principal x EUR          0.39  0.42 
       (0.10)  (0.09) 
Duration x JPY          -0.62   
       (0.16)   
Duration x GBP          1.55   
       (0.23)   
Duration  x  EUR       -0.45   
       (0.13)   
Number of Observations  17616  17488  17616 17420 16292 16611 
Pseudo-R
2  0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86 
Log-pseudo-likelihood  -854.7 844.8 -850.0 -832.6 -746.4 -791.2 
Table 10: Conditional logit estimates for choosing between foreign currencies: US firms  
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the currency choice. The estimated outcome is the 
probability of choosing a given currency (euro, yen, or pound) over the US dollar. All regressions include 
country and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. 34
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